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suicide bombings to cause both mass casual-
ties and widespread panic. Again, the point is 
that criminals and insurgents are turning a tool 
necessary for national defense on those who are 
unsuspecting and unarmed. Sadly, legacy land-
mines—some of which have been in the ground 
for decades—do not discriminate between war-
riors and innocents, making them an addition-
al passive, yet deadly disruptor of prosperity.
The issue of ending war well. Finally, I be-
lieve that recent on Just War Theory completed 
by Bian Orend, Michael Water, and myself, pos-
es a third question: “What does an ethical end to 
war look like?” Certainly in the past decade, we 
have seen strides toward more just and dura-
ble peace agreements than ever before, such as 
demobilization, disarmament and reintegra-
tion3 efforts, South Africa’s Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission, prosecutorial attempts 
against warmongers like Slobodan Milosevic, 
reconciliation processes and the like. An im-
portant component of DDR is those processes 
by which the national government asserts con-
trol over the military hardware it dispensed 
during the conflict. Government authorities 
should collect these items, professionalize the 
forces handling the weapons, safely and se-
curely stockpile them, and destroy the excess 
and obsolete items from their stocks, lest they 
become tools for renewed conflict. 
When it comes to landmines and associ-
ated ERW, establishing long-term conditions 
of peace means stewardship of land resourc-
es, including reclamation of transport links, 
water points and farmland from contamina-
With financial assistance from the U.S. State Department, Senegal has successfully collected and destroyed more than 
4,000 small arms, including MAS-36 submachine guns and MAT-49 rifles. 
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tion. This process is “ending well”: moving 
beyond the conditions from which conflict 
commenced. Furthermore, it is more often the 
case that such issues are seen as regional and 
international inhibitors to peace, so interna-
tional partnerships with foreign governments 
or nongovernmental organizations provide 
necessary assistance to ameliorate the legacies 
of conflict. This is jus post bellum.
Pragmatic International Security
This article has demonstrated that some of 
the ways we think about the destructive lega-
cies of war, such as ERW and the proliferation 
of illicit SA/LW, have roots in venerable Just 
War theory; however, the Just War tradition 
should not be thought of as merely an academ-
ic exercise. It marries real-world pragmatism 
with our hopes for security and justice.
Elsewhere I have argued that jus post 
bellum—post-conflict law, or ending war 
well—begins with political order and some-
times moves beyond mere order to justice. In 
a handful of instances, reconciliation can be 
the result.3  That is the goal many of us hope 
for when the hot war ends; however, with-
out a durable sociopolitical order—from ba-
sic safety to confidence that the land can be 
tilled and water can be drawn safely to as-
sure that the weapons of war have been safely 
stored—such security is but a fantasy. Conse-
quently, the efforts of major governments and 
nongovernmental actors in this regard are 
critical. For example, the U.S. State Depart-
ment funds efforts to secure and/or destroy 
excess and obsolete SA/LW, and has provid-
ed over US$1.3 billion to humanitarian mine 
action in the past two decades. Governments 
such as Japan, Canada and members of the 
European Union likewise contribute in order 
to promote the conditions for such security to 
take root.
The reason Just War theory has endured 
through the vicissitudes of Western history 
is because it bridges our moral ideals with 
the realities of a world characterized by 
self-interested—and often violent—power 
politics. What many do not realize is that 
Just War theory underlies many of our 
assumptions in the West, such as those 
governing proportionality and noncombatant 
immunity. Perhaps of equal importance is 
that it provides a rationale for what we can do 
to promote security around the world. 
See Endnotes Page 111
For additional references for this article, 
please visit http://tinyurl.com/krcvum.
While the news of the United Kingdom’s decision, under global pressure, to begin demining the Falkland-Malvinas Islands does show a commitment to holding countries to 
the agreements set up by Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention,2,3  the lo-
cation and situation of the landmines in discussion raise the question: 
Is demanding that the Falkland-Malvinas Islands be cleared a triumph 
in international diplomacy or a break with common sense? There are 
five distinct points that need to be made about this decision.
Cost of Demining
The Falkland-Malvinas Islands clearance process will be very 
expensive. First of all, the existing mines are laid mainly on the beaches 
and in soft ground. The result is that the mines may move in the peat 
and may be affected by the tides, complicating the process. Although a 
completed feasibility study shows that clearance may be possible, there are 
clear implications for cost. The recent U.K./Argentina feasibility study, 
of which the main element was a field survey conducted by Cranfield 
University, concludes that mine clearance in the Falkland-Malvinas 
Islands is possible but will present significant technical challenges and 
risks, which include risks related to possible environmental impact.4
While the feasibility study suggests that it is possible to grade 
the problem into degrees of complexity, the report does not identi-
fy costs (nor are there significant benefits against which these costs 
Clearing the Falkland-Malvinas Islands
by Robert Keeley [ RK Consulting Ltd. ]
Under pressure from nations around the world and in compliance with Article 5, the U.K. has committed to 
demining the Falkland-Malvinas Islands, despite the potential cost of demining in a relatively mine-safe1 area.
should be compared). The problem caused by this absolutist position is 
that we cannot now say that the British government can clear the easiest 
of these four categories and leave the hardest. To be Article 5-compliant, 
the British government has to clear them all, thus negating much of the 
benefit of this useful study.
No Casualties in Over 20 Years
 These mines pose a minimal threat to the Falkland-Malvinas 
Islands. There have been no civilian casualties since 1982,5 and there is 
little demand for the contaminated land. The Islanders themselves have 
been very vocal in asking the British government to spend its money else-
where. Mike Summers, a member of the legislative council of the Falk-
land-Malvinas Islands government, echoes this sentiment, saying, “There 
are a lot of mines in the Falklands, but they are not that intrusive. Clearly 
there is an issue about clearance, but unless they are cleared 110 percent, 
we are not going to take the fences down anyway. If that can be done, then 
fine. If the British government was to invest money in clearing mines, 
then we would be more than happy for them to invest it in other countries. 
Our needs are not as pressing as other people’s.”5 He goes on to say, “That 
doesn’t mean that in the fullness of time we don’t want it done. But we 
would feel somewhat embarrassed if the British government spent money 
clearing mines in the Falklands if there was an opportunity to spend it in 
some other territory where there are children and adults at risk.”5
This Falklands-Malvinas Islands minefield is a sanctuary for penguins. The birds’ ground-bearing pressure is insufficient to set off the mines, and their predators are too big to 
enter the minefield.
PHOTO COURTESY OF ROBERT KEELEY
1
Keeley: Clearing the Falkland-Malvinas Islands
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2009
 | editorial | the journal of ERW and mine action | summer 2009 | 13.1 13.1 | summer 2009 | the journal of ERW and mine action | editorial | 9
Environmental Harm
The clearance methods are likely to be in-
vasive and harmful to the environment. The 
feasibility study reviewed a number of po-
tential clearance methods including flailing, 
milling and bulk excavation. Some of these 
methods may endanger what have become ex-
cellent bird sanctuaries for penguins, as the 
groundbearing pressure of these birds is too 
small to set off anti-personnel mines. The fea-
sibility study identifies a number of remedia-
tion techniques that will then be used to solve 
the environmental damage caused by the de-
mining process, which will, of course, contrib-
ute to the cost. 
Total Contributions
There is also a risk that the British govern-
ment will treat this clearance as a contribu-
tion to its global mine-clearance effort. If this 
is allowed, then there may be a commensurate 
reduction in contributions to situations where 
it does make a difference. A parliamentary 
question to the British government asking for 
confirmation that the funding to demine the 
Falkland-Malvinas Islands will be treated as 
additional money would be a useful way of re-
solving this problem.
Past Deminer Casualties 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 
main reason the British Army stopped clear-
ance in the 1980s was the number of demin-
er casualties that occurred during the process. 
The feasibility study again is useful in spelling 
out a number of risk-management strategies 
that could be employed. The work the interna-
tional community has done in the development 
of the International Mine Action Standards 
should also be recognized as potentially being 
instrumental in helping reduce deminer casu-
alties. However, a reduced risk in casualties is 
still higher than the zero risk in deminer casu-
alties that is currently achieved by leaving these 
minefields alone. In attempting to clear them, 
one should conduct a risk/benefit analysis, and 
given that the benefit is negligible according to 
the feasibility study, it is hard to see how even a 
marginal increase in deminer risk is justified. Of 
course, the risk to the individual deminer can be 
compensated on an economic basis through the 
provision of incentives (i.e., salary), but this is-
sue goes back to the cost/benefit analysis which, 
although currently incomplete, suggests that 
clearance of the Falkland-Malvinas Islands sim-
ply is not worth it.
Intent of Ottawa Convention 
One possible objection to this approach to-
ward the Falkland-Malvinas Islands is that it 
would be a fundamental blow to the integrity 
of the Ottawa Convention, which was drafted 
specifically to prevent loopholes and other spe-
cial pleading weakening its effectiveness. This 
observation is valid; however, I would take a 
wider view. The whole point of the campaign 
is to reduce the humanitarian suffering caused 
by AP mines in the sense that these weapons 
are indiscriminate and excessively injurious. 
Given circumstances of scarce resources, a 
condition shared by humanitarian mine-ac-
tion programs, it seems that to enforce part of 
the Convention in circumstances where there 
is no humanitarian impact is missing the orig-
inal purpose of the ban. 
A Possible Way Ahead 
This perspective may seem very negative in 
terms of the current formulation of the Ottawa 
Convention and in particular toward Article 
5. However, I believe that the Ottawa Process 
has been so successful in the stigmatization 
of this approach that it is robust enough to 
sustain some amendments. One can see a 
prime example of a piece of legislation that has 
survived several significant amendments in the 
U.S. Constitution.7 Lessons can also be taken 
from the carbon-trading concept enshrined 
in the Kyoto Protocol.8 Given that landmines 
are forms of environmental pollution, 
countries that have a non-impact landmine 
problem could be allowed to offset them with 
an equivalent donation (under Article 6)9 to 
a country that is actually suffering impact 
from its contamination. An idea like this one 
was already suggested in the context of the 
Falkland-Malvinas Islands, and perhaps it is 
time to see it come to fruition. 
See Endnotes, Page 111
 For additional reading for this article, 
please visit http://tinyurl.com/c5aqat.
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Ongoing internal armed conflict1  is the determining factor in the landmine problem in Colombia. It is not simply one more element to take into consideration; it completely alters the 
panorama. Mines are a product of that conflict. As long as they are ac-
tive instruments in the dispute between forces, with each mine having 
an interested owner, mines will be a continuing source of risk for the 
population. As a result, people are confined, displaced and denied access 
to the necessities of daily life. The impact of mines never goes away for 
the victims, nor for their families and their communities.
Resolving the conflict is the only way to eliminate all mines from the 
national territory, and it is the only way to enable all Colombians to live 
without the trauma, loss of life, and social and economic blockages pro-
duced by landmines.
All Colombians have the right to live without the risk of finding a 
mine in their path. They have the right to cultivate their fertile lands, 
many of which have been abandoned due to fear. Until the conflict is re-
solved, however, the impact of mines must be reduced, better assistance 
must be provided to all current survivors and the number of new victims 
must be minimized.
Colombia is one of the few countries in the Americas where anti-
personnel landmines are in active use.2 Landmine victims have been 
recorded in Colombia since 1990, but the number rose sharply begin-
ning in 2001. Reasons for the increase may include the heightened use 
of landmines by guerrilla groups, improvement of reporting measure-
ment mechanisms and the increased movement of the population.2 
Today the problem affects people living in 31 of the 32 Colombian de-
partments3 and 60 percent of municipalities, with particular presence 
in rural communities.4
Colombia is among the countries with the greatest number of new 
victims. According to the 2007 Landmine Monitor Report, Colombia 
had 1,106 mine victims in 2006, which is greater than three victims per 
day. That same year, two-thirds of the victims were from the Army and 
police, which is the highest proportion anywhere in the world. The civilian 
victims alone (314, nearly one each day) were enough to place Colombia 
among the three countries with the most new mine victims.5 Though 
there was a decrease in victims the following year, Colombia continued 
to have more new victims than any other country. In 2007, there were 
895 victims: 193 were killed and 702 who were injured.2 
The presence of landmines in the different regions of the country 
changes according to the evolution of the armed conflict, as demon-
strated by comparing the locations of civilian victims over the period 
1990–2006 with those recorded in 2007. During this period, the four de-
partments6 with the greatest number of civilian victims were Antioquia, 
International Support to Mine Action 
in Colombia: Mitigating Impact and 
Protecting Rights
by Charles Downs [ Downs Consulting ]
Ending the decades-long violence in Colombia is the only way to eliminate all landmines from the country. 
Until that time, there is a need to mitigate their impact, minimize the number of new victims and assure better 
assistance to survivors.
A community in Nariño, a province in southern Colombia, took part in a meeting against 
mines in its territory. Nariño has mines in 35 of its 63 municipalities.
PHOTO COURTESY OF BORJA PALADINI
Meta, Bolívar and Caquetá. Antioquia had more victims than the other 
three combined. In 2007, the four departments with the highest num-
ber of casualties were Nariño, Antioquia, Guaviare and Arauca.  Nariño 
had more than the other three combined, reflecting the intensification 
of armed conflict there.2
What Can Be Done?
Considering the experiences of similarly contaminated countries, 
there are three lines of action that can be taken by various levels of gov-
ernment and civil society with the support of international organiza-
tions, even during a period of armed conflict. These measures include:
1. Reduce risk 
2. Provide comprehensive support to victims 
3. Develop the capacity to coordinate and manage a multifaceted 
response to the landmine problem
Reduce risk. People have a need and a right to know how to pro-
tect themselves from danger, and the public sector has an obligation 
to inform them. There are many mine-risk education programs that 
have been developed around the world through mass media, schools, 
U.S. Donations to Lebanon Help with Immense Needs 
The United States has contributed $1.5 million to Mines Advisory Group for landmine clearance in Lebanon. Twelve thou-
sand square kilometers (7,456 square miles) of land in Lebanon are affected by cluster bombs, which remain from the 2006 
conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. Many of these bombs failed to detonate on impact and pose a continuing risk to the 
Lebanese population.
Recently, there has been a reduction in funding by donors for mine-clearance groups in Lebanon, which has and led to fears 
that clearance in the country could come to an end. BACTEC, a commercial demining team based in the U.K., was forced to 
end operations in the country. The Swedish Rescue Services Agency and Norwegian’s People’s Aid are both lacking funds, while 
DanChurchAid has cut its demining teams from five to two. The U.S. donation will keep 10 clearance companies in Lebanon 
until the 2009’ summer’s end, although MAG is still seeking donations to continue its work.
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